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Summary findings
In 1995, 57 countries depended on three commodities  programs that used market-based approaches for dealing
for more than half their exports, reports UNCTAD. And  with market uncertainty.
commodities, fuels, grains, and oilseeds are important  This change in approach coincided with a significant
imports for several countries. The notorious volatility of  rise in the use of market-based commodity risk
commodity prices is a major source of instability and  management instruments  -aided  by the liberalization of
uncertainty in commodity-dependent  countries, affecting  markets, the lowering of trade and capital control
governments, producers  (farmers), traders, processors,  barriers, and the globalization of commodity markets.
and financial institutions. Further,  commodity price  By the mid-1990s, several governments, state
instability has a negative impact on economic growth,  companies, and private sector participants began using
income distribution, and poverty alleviation.  commodity derivatives markets to hedge their
Early attempts to deal with commodity price volatility  commodity price risks. Participation in those markets is
relied on buffer stocks, buffer funds, government  growing, but important barriers to access remain,
intervention  in commodity markets, and international  including counterparty risk, problems small groups (such
commodity agreements to stabilize prices. These were  as farmers) have aggregating risks, basis risk (no
largely unsuccessful - sometimes spectacularly so.  correlation  of local and international prices), no local
Buffer funds went bankrupt,  commodity agreements  reference prices, low liquidity, no derivatives markets for
were suspended, buffer stocks proved ineffective, and  certain products, and low levels of knowhow.
government intervention was both costly and ineffective.  International  institutions, local governments, and the
As the poor performance of such stabilization schemes  private sector could facilitate developing countries'
became more evident, academics and policvmakers began  access to derivatives markets and the use of risk
distinguishing between programs that tried to alter price  management tools to solve public sector problems.
distribution (domestically or internationally) and
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Summary Findings
Many developing countries depend to a large extent on commodities for their
exports and government revenues. According to statistics from UNCTAD, in 1995 fifty-
seven developing countries depended for over 50% of their exports on three commodities.
Commodities, fuels, grains and oilseeds, are also very important imports for several
developing countries. Commodity prices are notoriously volatile which is a major source
of instability and uncertainty for commodity-dependent developing countries.
Commodity price volatility affects governments, producers (farmers), traders, processors,
and local financial institutions financing commodities in these countries. Studies have
also found that commodity price instability has a negative impact on economic growth,
income distribution and poverty alleviation.
In the past, there have been several attempts to deal with commodity price
volatility.  A number and variety of international and national institutions and programs
were designed for this purpose.  Most of the earlier attempts concentrated in trying to
stabilize prices through the use mainly of buffer stocks, buffer funds, government
intervention in commodity markets, and international commodity agreements. These
schemes have not proven satisfactory in dealing with commodity price instability.
Experiences have shown that buffer funds have gone bankrupt, international commodity
agreements have been suspended, buffer funds have proven ineffective, and government
intervention has been too costly and overall ineffective. As the poor performance of
stabilization schemes became more evident, academics and policy makers began to
emphasize the distinction between programs that attempted to alter the price distribution,
either domestically or internationally, with programs that deal with market uncertainty
using market-based solutions.
The rise in market-based commodity risk management instruments has been
significant the last ten to fifteen years.  The proliferation of these instruments is aided by
the globalization of commodity markets, market liberalization, and lower trade and
capital control barriers.  During the 1  990s, several private sector participants, state-owned
companies and governments in developing countries have started using commodity
derivatives markets to hedge their commodity price risks.  While the participation of
these countries in commodity derivatives market is growing, there are still certain
important barriers in accessing these markets.  Among the most frequently cited barriers
are: low levels of know-how, counterparty risk, problems related to aggregation of risks
from smaller entities (such as farmers), basis risk (or lack of correlation of local to
international prices), lack of local reference prices, and low liquidity or absence of
derivatives markets for certain commodities. International institutions, local governments,
and the private sector could facilitate the access of developing countries to derivatives
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Commodities provide food and livelihood for many families and communities,
provide export earnings and income for many governments, and provide raw materials for
processors.  Often, commodities are at the heart of local economies and sometimes
national economies.  Commodity markets are also volatile.  It is probably safe to say that
all countries have engaged in some type of public effort to manage commodity price
risks.  Moreover, many economies are highly dependent on commodities and that
dependence, coupled with volatile prices, can present  an obstacle to development.  In this
paper we review the development of international efforts to tame commodity markets and
the economic thought behind those efforts.  We also draw distinctions among the several
categories of risk faced by producers, consumers and governments in developing
countries and suggest appropriate roles for governments and the international community.
Finally we argue that the rapid development of commodity price risk markets over the
last decade offers promising market-based policy alternatives.
The paper is structured as follows.  Section II discusses the nature of price
volatility and presents several measures. We present evidence that generally price
volatility dominates output fluctuations and that there are no significant portfolio effects
between commodities.  In other words, price fluctuations between commodities do not
offset each other.  Section III reviews the literature on commodity price stabilization
concluding that the traditional approaches have not been satisfactory.  Consequently
economists and policy makers have turned their attention to at market-based commodity
risk management instruments, such as commodity derivatives (forwards, futures, options,
swaps), as means to reducing price uncertainty. Section IV categorizes the types of
problems policy makers face as a consequence of price volatility.  Section V presents
evidence that derivatives markets for risk management have been growing rapidly due to
commodity marketing and trade liberalization.  The growth in commodity derivatives
markets presents opportunities for developing countries and economies in transition to
hedge their commodity related risks.  Section VI documents steps governments and donor
groups have taken to encourage private markets for risk instruments.  Section VII
presents case studies in the use of commodity derivatives markets by developing
countries.  The first case study deals with the issues of price protection for agricultural
producers and the second deals with hedging the exposure of government revenues to
commodity prices.  Section VIII  concludes.
II. COMMODITY MARKETS AND VOLATILITY
Commodity prices are notoriously volatile.  Prices change day to day, and indeed
on active exchanges change minute to minute.  Prices change between the time of
purchase and the time of export and between planting and harvest time.  Prices change
year to year and they change relative to other prices. These characteristics are not unique
to commodity markets, but they have generated and continue to generate a special set ofCommodity  risk management  and  development  Larson,  Varangis  and Yabuki
issues and problems for market participants and policy makers because many
communities and countries remain dependent on commodities. Price volatility and
income volatility are also development issues, since many primary commodity producers
are also poor.
Characteristics of price and income volatility
Figure 1 charts monthly indices of petroleum, food and metals prices on
international markets from 1983 to 1998. Figure 2 shows the same indices relative to the
price of manufactured goods from developed countries. The indices are trade-weighted to
provide an overall measure of developing countries' terms of trade.  The terms-of-trade
indices are designed to measure a commodity-exporting  country's ability to pay for
capital goods manufactured in developed countries. Since the 1950s, many economists
and policy makers have argued that volatile income and declining purchasing power have
been an impediment to development. Both figures are characterized  by peaks and
valleys. And while the hypothesis of  declining  terms of trade appears to hold up over the
long run, it is easy to find exceptional commodities and exceptional periods.] Indeed,
many commodity markets experience short sharp price spikes followed by extended
periods of considerably lower prices.  Consequently, commodity-dependent  economies
are often characterized by boom-bust cycles.
Questions concerning what constitutes commodity price volatility and how it
should be measured have generated considerable  debate. Beginning with Massell (1970),
most empirical studies attempt to measure unanticipated  price movements. In practice,
various de-trending schemes are employed, sometimes leading to contradictory results.
See, for example, Glezakos (1973), Knudsen and Parnes (1975), Lam (1980), or Cuddy
and Della Valle (1978), or MacBean and Nguyen (1980). Further, adjusting the terms-of-
trade for quality improvements  further complicates generalizations. Figure 3 provides the
results of one measure, similar to the index used by MacBean and Nguyen.
Where option markets exist, implicit volatility measures can be inferred -- at least
over the life of the option. Such measures are short-term in nature and are themselves
usually based on assumed underlying distributions of random movements. Table 1
presents data from the Chicago Board of Trade daily volatility report which shows the
disparity between commodity volatility and the volatility of some financial instruments.
In addition, the term structure of future markets and inventory data can also be used to
derive implicit measures of price volatility. (See Larson, 1994.)
Price effects dominate quantity effects.
See Grilli and Yang, 1988 and Diakosavvas and Scandizzo, 1991.
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Generally, governments, firms and individuals are more concerned with issues of
income or revenue stability rather than price movements. For metals or energy
commodities, production quantities are generally known, and volatile prices explain most
revenue variability. However, agricultural commodities, especially field crops, are also
subject to variable weather and pest conditions. Consequently,  price-risk instruments
address only a portion of the underlying problem. Still, for the most part, price effects
tend to dominate quantity effects -- at least when measured globally.
In Table 2, the variance, in logs, of world export earnings for selected agricultural
commodities is decomposed into three components: price effect, quantity effect and cross
effect. As shown in the table, the price effect had been the most significant determinant of
export earnings volatility for the all selected commodities except maize during 1970-95.
The results confirm previous studies. For example, UNCTAD examined the volatility of
major non-oil exports of developing countries from 1962 to 1981 and found that 101 out
of the 174 cases had larger unit value volatility than quantity volatility (Maizels, 1992).
Furthermore, of 73 cases that quantity volatility is larger than unit value volatility, value
volatility exceeds volume volatility for 41 cases. Also, Yabuki and Akiyama (1996)
examined export revenues of 12 major primary commodities in developing countries and
found that of 8 out of 12 commodities show significantly higher price effect than quantity
effect.
No significant natural portfolio effects.
Commodity prices are volatile, but farmers may choose to produce a portfolio of
goods and countries may derive income from exporting more than one commodity.
Consequently, the negative impact of price movements could be overstated if fluctuations
between different commodity prices offset each other. For instance, when one country
exports several commodities and if price movement of one commodity is negatively
correlated to others, then this country's price risk on exported goods may be reduced.
Likewise, if one country's price movement of exported goods is positively correlated to
that of imported goods, then the net effects of price volatility may be reduced. If this is
true, the price volatility has its main impact on the allocation of traded goods rather than
on the aggregate level of the price volatility. This issue relates to portfolio management.
Table 3 shows a simple correlation among price indices of selected commodity groups
during 1970-95. It is observed that all nominal indices are related positively meaning that
they have had a tendency to move together during the period. In real terms, several pairs
show insignificant relations.  It is noteworthy that prices do not demonstrate negatively
significant relations with one exception (timber and petroleum).
More formally, Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) examined the price movements of
unrelated commodities and concluded that the prices tend to move together even after
accounting for macroeconomic effects. This phenomenon is called excess comovement.
They point out herd effect and liquidity constraints as two reasons for excess
comovement. Herd effect occurs when traders across different commodities  react in a
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similar way to non-economic  factors. Liquidity constraints arises when a fall in the price
of one commodity lowers that of other commodities because it decreases the liquidity of
speculators who are simultaneously  "long" in several commodities.
However, recent studies have challenged the conclusions, finding only weak
evidence of excess comovement. For example, Palaskas and Varangis (1991) found that
excess comovement is an exception rather than the rule. More recently, Partha, Trivedi
and Varangis (1996) using monthly time series data for nine commodities found only
weak evidence of excess comovement. In addition, the empirical analyses of Leyborne,
Lloyd and Reed (1993) suggested that excess comovement occurs only infrequently.
Together, these studies imply that there is no strong natural portfolio effects among
commodity prices.
Still, for countries who have exposure on both exports and imports there is some
portfolio effect since commodity export prices may correlate positively with commodity
import prices. For example, beverage prices are positively correlated with grain and oil
prices. Thus, a coffee or cocoa exporter that  imports wheat or oil has some natural
hedge.
Many developing countries depend on commodities
Diversification of income sources provides a natural hedge for many individuals,
firrms  and economies. Still many developing countries, especially in Africa, remain as
dependent on commodity exports for earnings as they were in the 1960s. (See, for
example, Akiyama and Larson, 1992). Table 4 lists countries with export dependence on
three leading commodities  greater than 50 percent. For 1990-92,  thirty-four African
countries, 9 Asian countries and 14 Latin American countries fall into this category.
Some countries depend almost exclusively  on single non-oil primary commodities. For
instance, cotton in Burkina Faso, copper in Zambia and uranium in Niger accounted for
99 percent of their exports during this period.
With exception of oil dependent countries, countries with high GDP per capita
and high GDP growth appear less dependent on a limited number of commodities.
Conversley, countries that are dependent on a limited number of commodities generally
have a high external debt ratio as percent of GNP-for  example, Congo (365.8 %),
Zambia (191.3 %), Angola (274.9 %) and Guinea-Bissau (353.7 %).  Furthermore,
resources devoted to servicing the debt (debt service as a percent of exports of goods and
services) among these countries is also  high.
Whether commodity producing farming households are also commodity
dependent is a more complicated  issue. Limited empirical evidence suggests that in
As discussed later, portfolio considerations distinquish the IMF's CCFF program single-commodity
policy instruments.
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many rural households, farmers may derive a small share of their household income from
cash crops. Still, the commodity crop can represent a high proportion of cash income and
may provide cash at an important  time.  For example, cash receipts for cotton in Uganda
arrive when school tuitions are due. We return to this issue again in Section III.
III. ECONOMIC THOUGHT,  INSTITUTIONS  AND
COMMODITY  PRICE INSTABILITY
The number and variety of international and national institutions and programs
designed over the past half century to address the disruptive and negative effects of
commodity price instability reflect the many consequences of volatile commodity
markets. These include macroeconomic  effects on currencies, inflation and growth and
microeconomic effects on producers, intermediaries,  and consumers -- especially the
poor.
Following the turbulent 1930s,  the international  community looked for
mechanisms to tame economic cycles and currency volatility and ideas from economists
and policy makers of that time shaped many present-day institutions. Short-term balance
of payment problems caused by volatile commodity prices were viewed as an especially
important trade-based component of macroeconomic instability. At Bretton Woods,
Keynes (1943) proposed a world currency based on a price index of the thirty most-traded
commodities. 3 By linking currencies to the index, commodity  prices and price-related
swings in trade eamings would be largely stabilized in an automatic fashion. Keynes also
proposed a commodity stabilization scheme that included buffer stocks and a central
fund.  While Keynes' ideas were not incorporated into the charters of the Bretton Woods
institutions founded at that time, the ideas would resurface. A succession of proposed
internationally backed compensatory financing schemes followed the Bretton Woods
conference, including the 1953 Olano Proposal for a Mutual Insurance Scheme; the 1961
Development Insurance Fund; the 1962 Organization  of American States Proposal; the
Swedish and Brazilian Proposals at the Committee for International Commodity Trade
meetings and the French Proposal for Market Organizations, all in 1963.
Also in 1963, the IMF began to offer compensatory financing to countries
experiencing an unexpected temporary decline in export eamings. The on-going program
is based on net export earnings, rather than a single set of commodities, thus taking
advantage of any natural portfolio effect that might arise from diversified exports and
imports. Hewitt (1993) states that the IMF's program functioned well early and was used
by developed and developing countries alike, but became expensive and laden with
conditionalities by the mid-1980s. Later, as part of Lome I in 1975, the EU offered its
own compensatory financing scheme, STABEX,  to ACP countries. Since then, the
program has suffered from inadequate funding and a variety of implementation  problems.
See Hewitt (1993) for a discussion of Keynes' proposal in the context of STABEX and compensatory
financing.
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Under current proposals, STABEX  is likely to be drastically modified, if not eliminated
as the current Lome agreement expires in 20004  (European Commission, 1996).
In 1965, a World Bank study (World Bank, 1965; Hewitt, 1993)  proposed a fund
to supplement the IMF's program. In that document, Bank staff argued that shortfalls in
export earnings not only lead to foreign exchange problems, but constrained economic
growth.  Consequently,  unforeseen events could render development programs
unaffordable. To counter this, the Bank should insure a mutually agreed upon
development program against unanticipated shortfalls in export earnings that could not
otherwise be covered. The program differed from earlier compensatory financing
schemes in its emphasis on sustaining development programs through revenue shortfalls
rather than stabilizing exchange rates. Although much discussed, the program was.never
adopted.
In 1950 Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) independently offered the hypothesis
that, because of differing elasticities of income and demand, prices for primary
commodity exports would fall relative to manufactured imports. 5 Consequently, the net
barter terms of trade for commodity  producing developing countries would decline. This
contradicted the long-standing notion of increasing scarcity put forward by Malthus and
Ricardo. Soon thereafter, the two ideas were combined so that the "commodity
dependency" problem was characterized  by declining terms of trade and volatile export
earnings. Generally economists argued that instability of export earnings limited
development through adverse effects on income, inflation, savings and investment.
Using data from Malaysian rubber plantations, Caine (1954) challenged the
negative link between revenue instability and investment. Caine argued that increased
revenues during boom periods resulting in increased savings and investment. Later,
MacBean (1966) also challenged the findings using cross-country data as did Knudsen
and Parnes (1975). More recently, Deaton (1992) finds that for Africa overall,
investment and ultimately GDP expand more to export price increases than contract in
response to price falls. Conversely, Dawe (1996) calculates instability indices for a
cross-section of countries by taking account of the share of exports in any given economy
and finds that export instability is negatively associated with growth and investment.
Hausman and Gavin (1996) find that volatility decreased economic growth and
investment in Latin America. At the same time they found evidence that volatility
adversely affects income distribution and raises poverty rates. In summary, the empirical
For example, Chapter VI of a much discussed European Commission  Green Paper on the future of Lome
concludes: "The evaluations also suggest that the Stabex and Sysmin systems need to be abolished or
at least amended."
5The  usual Prebish-Singer arguments concern the barter terms of trade -- that is, relative prices.  Given the
scope for productivity gains, for example, changes in the barter terms of trade may have little to say
about welfare.  See Diakosavvas and Scandizzo, 1991 for more complete discussions.
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results of both cross-country and single country studies spanning four decades of research
have been mixed. The same can be said for general-equilibrium  studies. 6
Beginning in the 1950s,  many governments of commodity-producing  countries
took on the task of managing commodity  markets through international agreements.
Under United Nations auspices five international  commodity agreements  were signed by
producing and consuming countries: the International Sugar Agreement (1954), Tin
Agreement (1954), Coffee Agreement (1962), Cocoa Agreement (1972), and Natural
Rubber Agreement (1980). Generally, the agreements  were intended to address declining
terms of trade through supply management, and price volatility through buffer stock
operations. In 1968, UNCTAD put forward a proposal similar to Keynes' earlier
proposal.  Ultimately, the 1968 proposal resulted in a 1975 resolution passed at a special
session of UNCTAD in Nairobi, calling for an Integrated Program for Commodities
covering ten core commodities identified by UNCTAD as storable. Consistent with
Keynes original proposal, a financial fund was to be established to provide liquidity to
individual buffer stock. Ultimately, the proposal resulted in the creation of the Common
Fund for Commodities.
These agreements, however, were unable to adapt to changes in the market, and
by 1996 the economic clauses in them had all lapsed or failed (Gilbert 1987, 1996),
victims of politics and economics. 7 The Natural Rubber Agreement was resuscitated in
1997 and remains the only agreement with a functioning economic clause. Funds
dedicated to buffer stock management at the Common Fund have never been used for that
purpose.
Countries have also pursued stabilization  goals unilaterally. The purposes and
instruments of price stabilization are varied, but can be broadly classified. The goals of
stabilization include: i) intra-seasonal stabilization  where harvest prices are announced
prior to the planting season so that farmers can better plan their allocation of resources°;
ii) inter-annual smoothing of prices to stabilize producer incomes; iii) inter-annual
smoothing of prices to limit inflation or smooth consumer  budgets 9; iv) smoothing of
6 See Behrman,  (1987),  Maizels,  (1992)  and Dawe  (1996)  for  reviews  of arguments  and  empirical  studies
on growth and export instability.
7 The Tin Agreement failed in a specacular fashion, almost bringing down the London Metals Exchange.
8 Historic and present-day examples of government  offerings of some minimum producer price are
ubiquitous and include the three North American countries, the EU, the Mercosur countries, Japan,
India, Indonesia and most African countries.
9 Many of the same countries that provide within-season  price stabilization mechanisms -- such as a
minimum producer price-- also provide  price-smoothing across seasons. For example, minimum
prices for domestic producers in many of the Mercosur countries are based on a moving average of
world market prices (Quiroz and Valdes, 1993.) Other countries, intervene from public stockpiles to
influence domestic markets.  Examples include rice markets in the Philippines, South Korea,
Bangladesh, India and Indonesia.
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export earnings to stabilize government revenue or exchange rates  I 0 o. Govermnments  may
also be motivated by self preservation motives as well, since food shortages and rapid
increases in food prices can result in regime changes.'I 1 Knudsen and Nash (1  990) group
the instruments or institutional arrangements  for price stabilization as follows: i) physical
buffer stock schemes; ii) stabilization  funds or variable tariff schemes; and 3) marketing
boards.
While the links between price volatility, savings, investment and growth remain
controversial, there is general agreemenit  that some govern-ments  face difficulties
managing their budgets and currencies as a consequence of trade instability stemming
from commodity price volatility and that price volatility reduces producer welfare.
However, most real-world examples of stabilization schemes are considered unsuccessful
and often unnecessary. Early on, Bauer and Parish (1  952) noted that the stabilization
objectives of most marketing boards were ill defined and potentially a guise for taxation.
Writing nearly forty years later, Knudsen and Nash would present further examples of
confused and conflicting stabilization  and income support objectives. Wright and
Williams (1990) noted the wide-spread failure of domestic stabilization schemes of all
sorts and linked the failure to the nature of commodity  prices and underlying models of
storage. Examining the time-series  properties of commodity prices, Deaton (1  992)
argued that the series tended to be mean-reverting  --  a conditioni  for a successful
stabilization fund --  but that the reversion took place over years. Consequently,
successful stabilization funds needed impractically large lines of credit. Later, Larson
and Coleman (1  993) showed that, even with hedging, commodity price movements will
eventually bankrupt stabilization schemes. Gilbert (1  996) noted a variety of causes for
the failure of international commodity agreements.
In 1954, Friedman stressed the importance of private savings rather than public
stabilization schemes in solving the producer income problem. Later, in 198  1, Newbery
and Stiglitz argued that incomes and ultimately consumption  rather than prices should be
the focus of the farmer's risk-management  problem. Given freedom of choice, the
potential gains from reduced volatility were often not significant since farmners  provide
some measure of self-insurance by undertaking a portfolio of activities and by saving.
Collier and Gunning (1  996) offer similar arguments when advising against commodity
export taxes during boom periods. In addition, Newbery and Stiglitz and later Williams
and Wright (1991) argue that domestic public storage schemes aimed at stabilizing prices
largely displace private storage rather than generate  welfare gains.
10 Knudsen  and  Nash  note  that  some  countries  such  as Malaysia,  Sri  Lanka,  Kenya  and  Colombia  use
progressive  export  tax rates  to offset the price variability of exports. Others, such as Botswana (Hill,
1991)  used international  reserves,  and  fiscal  measures  to maintain  stable  exchange  rates. See
Hausman  (1995)  for  a discussion  of fiscal  revenue  risk  in Latin  America.  A few  countries,  like  Chile
for copper, operate a formal stabilization fund that smooths export revenues (Arrau and Claessens,
1992.)
For example, Deaton (1993) finds a correlation between commodity prices, economic growth and
political survival in 44 African countries.
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Household studies confirm that farmers in developing countries self-insure
through a variety of formal and informal mechanisms including diversification of crops
12 and labor, gift-giving, and income-and-responsibility  sharing, . (See Morduch, 1998 and
Fafchamps, 1998 for reviews.) Using household data, Paxson (1992) confirms earlier
observations by Cain and Friedman and shows that Thai rice farmers save most, if not all
transitory income. However, self-insurance can prove expensive (Robertson, 1987) and
unreliable (Alderman and Paxson, 1992). For example, returns to liquid savings can be
negative (Deaton, 1991) or heavily taxed by inflation (Fafchamps, 1998.) Moreover, self-
insurance schemes can fail when they are needed most, particularly in time of drought.
(See, for example, Reardon, Matlon and Delgado 1988). In addition, even if self-
insurance through savings and other mechanisms work, Timmer (1989) has argued that
traditional analysis ignores the dynamic costs of adjusting and readjusting to volatile
prices.
As the poor performance of stabilization schemes became more evident, writers
began to emphasize the distinction between policies that attempted to change the
distribution of prices internationally or domestically with policies of managing
uncertainty using markets for price risk. McKinnon explored the use of futures markets as
an alternative to buffer stocks in 1967. Later Gilbert (1985) demnonstrated  that hedging
on forward markets could substitute for some of the welfare gains normally associated
with buffer stocks. Gemmill (1985) argued that futures markets for cocoa, coffee, and
sugar would provide an attractive mechanism for hedging export earnings risks and that
forward contracts could be substantially cheaper than buffer stock operations. O'Hara
(1984) looked at the use of commodity bonds to stabilize consumption. Rolfo (1980)
investigated the use of futures for cocoa producing prices and calculates the optimal
hedge ratio in the presence of both production (output) and price volatility.  1 3 Overdahl
(1987) demonstrated the benefits of oil futures markets for oil producing states. Kletzer,
Newbery and Wright (1990) proposed financial instruments to smooth commodity export
revenue and Claessens (1991) has pointed out that commodity bonds can be used to
hedge debt management problems associated with volatile export earnings. Lapan,
Moshini and Hanson (1990) discussed the microeconomic  relationship between
production and hedging.
Moreover, the theoretical findings have also become increasingly practical with
the expansion of liquid futures and derivative markets. Sakong, Hayes and Hallam
(1993) discuss the usefulness of hedging in the presence of production uncertainty. And
Morgan, Rayner and Ennew (1994) conclude that futures markets for cocoa, coffee, sugar
12 See Jean and Peter Lanjouw (1998) for a reveiw of household surveys that measure sources of rural
household income, including off-farm activities.
3 Rolfo shows that the ratio of optimal hedge to expected output should be below unity. Thus, limited
usage of the futures market may be superior to a full short hedge of expected output when there is
production variability.
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and wheat -- key markets  for developing  countries'  exports  and food imports -- are
efficient and therefore provide viable policy options for risk management Recent
country-specific studies include Claessens and Varangis (1994) for oil in Venezuela;
Satyanarayan.  et al. (1995) for cotton in Africa; Quattara, Schroeder and Sorenson (1990)
for Cote d'Ivoire; Faruqee, Coleman and Scott (1997) for wheat in Pakistan.
While some writers stress the conditional cost advantages of risk-management
over policies such as buffer-stock operations that attempt to alter price distributions
(Gemmil, 1985; Hughes-Hallet and Ramanujam, 1991),  other practical advantages exist
as well. First and most importantly, risk management generally does not require
collective action. Companies or individuals can frequently hedge independent of specific
government programs and governments can pursue policies independent of international
action.  This is especially important given the propensity for international commodity
agreements to fail.  Further, there are often advantages relative to specific instruments.
For example, buffer stocks are subject to large accumulations14  or stock-outs 5; and
compensatory financing schemes such as STABEX provide revenues ex-post drawing on
limited donor resources. In contrast, risk-management instruments rely on private capital
and payouts are automatic. Further the costs of managing risk, as with insurance, is
known up-front although the ultimate value of the strategy is only know ex post.
IV. COUNTRY  POLICY  AND RISK  MANAGEMENT
As the discussion above indicates, the consequences of commodity price volatility
are varied. In this section we categorize the "problems" associated with commodity price
volatility from a policy perspective. In dealing with private agents such as producers,
traders and processors of commodities, we take as a starting point the merits of freedom
of choice. For problems related to governments  -- issues of budget, debt and trade
instability, we emphasize the ex ante use of hedging techniques. As Bauer, Knudsen and
Nash and other writers have noted, policies dealing with commodity price risk problems
are frequently poorly defined and poorly targeted. Table 5 provides broad categories of
price related risks intended to guide the discussion below. Although very general, the
classification illustrates the point that the problems are varied and call for different and
targeted policies.
At the most general level governments can be a sources of price volatility through
fiscal or monetary policy mismanagement  or a failure to handle external financial shocks.
Generally, changes in international commodity prices and changes in exchange rates are
eventually reflected in domestic prices-even  for policy-insulated agricultural prices
(Mundlak and Larson, 1992.) Commodity-dependent  countries have the added burden of
14 For example,  the US CCC program  in late 1980s.
For example, the International Natural Rubber Organization's buffer stock went from large
accumulations (some of the rubber was actually frozen) to a stock-out in the mid 1  990s.
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handling the macroeconomic  effects of commodity booms and busts (Varangis, Akiyama
and Mitchell, 1995.) Consequently, sound economic  management can reduce price and
income volatilities. This is especially important when the poor rely on fragile self-
insurance strategies.
Still, for any given level of volatility, market participants throughout the economy
may lack access to international  markets for risk management instruments. Some of the
limits faced in markets for risk instruments are shared by all contracts (Posner, 1998);
however, in many cases, markets for risk instruments face additional barriers.
Governments sometimes prohibit outright the development of local markets for risk
instruments because they potentially complicate  currency and interest rate management
policies, or because of restrictions on capital flows. In other cases, governments may fear
the consequences of unregulated markets on poorly informed consumers, but may also
lack the capacity to regulate.  16 Moreover, international  providers of risk instruments may
choose not to participate in some markets due to perceived credit or sovereign risk.  We
return to this topic later in the paper.
Commodity price volatility problems can be categorized also by affected groups.
Private sector participants are likely to be a diverse group with diverse needs. Given
scope for choice, market participants will utilize a variety of risk-management
techniques. Providing access to international price risk markets gives market participants
greater scope for managing risks, and given opportunity, private traders and processors
are likely to utilize risk markets directly. However, farmers generally do not, and rely on
intermediaries such as grain elevators or warehouses to offer for example, short-term
price guarantees. In turn, markets for delivering risk-management  tools must have their
basis in efficient domestic markets -- including markets for storage -- that can be linked
to international commodity markets. Consequently,  policies that promote efficient
domestic markets through market liberalization,  investments in infrastructure,  and
dissemination of market information  also support markets for risk management
instruments.
Ultimately, household are concerned about risk to income, or more broadly
wealth, rather than price instability' 7. Rural households dependent on commodity
production may hedge their income risks in many ways, including diversification and
informal social arrangements in which family or friends assist in time of need. Where
price-risk markets are available, farmers could also generate income by combining price-
6 For example, in Indonesia, a number of local brokers of futures and options were shut down in 1993.
The industry lacked a regulatory framework in which to operate and and were portrayed as "bucket
shops."  Traders and processors of cocoa, palm oil and other commodities had access to risk
management markets, but did so through Singapore or other off-shore brokers.
See Bliss and Stem (1982) and Binswanger  and Rosenzweig  (1984) for discussions  of smallholder labor
decisions and risk.
11Commodity risk management and development  Larson, Varangis and Yabuki
insurance with crop, yield or weather insurance.' 8 Still, there are limits to the ability of
very poor households to self-insure  and governments  often choose to intervene in markets
to offer some minimal protection to producers or consumers. 19And  despite the importance
20 of production-related  risks, most government programs intervene to influence price.
Generally, crop insurance programs, public and private, have not proven successful.
(Hazell, 1992.) This is not to diminish the potential value of programs that might address
catastrophic crop loss.
Governments are also concerned with food security and the ability of the
government to provide a safety net in the case of extreme weather events. However, there
are limits to the current markets to address such issues fully. Weather-related shortfalls
in domestic production can not be fully addressed with price-based instruments and
weather-event and other rare-event instruments are only now evolving. 21 We return to
these topics later.
Some developing countries do participate in risk markets through their parastatals,
especially in the petroleum and metals markets. Government-owned  companies such as
PEMEX in Mexico and Codelco in Chile have a well established presence in the
commodity risk markets. And as we discuss later, the direct presence of developing
countries in some of these markets is growing rapidly. For these entities, "agent"
problems and issues of oversight and transparency are especially relevant. Past mistakes
at Codelco and in Orange County, California, highlight the potential consequences of
poorly managed public participation  in risk markets. Still, there are successful models of
oversight. For example, the State of Texas empowers a Depository Board to oversee it
22 hedge of oil royalties  . Southern California,  a US public utility, separates strategy,
18  There are reasons why markets for commodity  price and weather might evolve separately. While
farmers worry about income, functioning storage markets will reduce the chance  of stockouts for
agricultural consumers -- although consumers  will continue to worry about price.  Disparate groups,
including farmers, transporters, vacation businesses and energy producers may worry about the
effects of weather.
19 For example, see Pinckney (1993) on food policies in southern Africa.
20 Generally, crop insurance programs, public and private, have not proven successful. (Hazell, 1992.)
This is not to diminish the potential value of programs that might address catastrophic crop loss.
Indeed, innovations in the capital markets that take advantage of new risk instruments for catastrophic
events such as hurricanes may foreshadow new methods for delivering weather-based insurance
instruments.
21See  Miranda and Glauber (1997) for a discussion about systemic risk and crop insurance. An interesting
recent development in financial derivatives is the catastrophy or "cat" bond.  These instruments are to
date relate primarily to earthquake or hurican events and are designed to spread risk throughout the
capital  markets rather than keeping it on insurers' own books. According to the Economist magazine
(Feb. 28, 1998), seven issues worth a total of $1.1 billion were sold between 1994 and 1996.
22 The state has hedged oil-based revenues since 1992.  The Depository Board comprises  the State
Comptroller, the State Bank Commissioner and Citizen member.
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execution and reporting among a Hedge Committee, a Trader, brokerage firms, Treasury
and Accounting.
While governments may intervene in domestic markets,  justifiably or otherwise,
to protect producers and consumers from volatile markets, they face risk-related problems
in managing their own affairs as well. Broadly these fall into the central bank problems
of managing reserves and managing debt, and the treasury problem of managing budget
shortfalls. As noted earlier, economists have demonstrated  the feasibility and potential
benefits of using market-based instruments  to address these issues. Cassard and Folkerts-
Landau (1997) provide examples of how governments in Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden,
Colombia and Hungary use instruments tied to exchange rate, interest rate, liquidity and
sometimes commodity markets to manage their debt.23  Practical experience; however is
24 limited.  The same is true of current budgets where governments  typically manage
shortfalls by borrowing.25 Similarly, new borrowing either from capital markets or from
donor programs like the CCFF or STABEX  has been the traditional solution for export
earning shortfalls. However increased borrowing may not be an option for highly
indebted countries, or countries where binding agreements limit new debt. Moreover,
schemes such as compensatory financing programs have lacked timeliness. Donors as
26 well as commodity-dependent  countries are looking for alternatives.  Some current
programs that use market based instruments to resolve public sector problems related to
commodity price risk are illustrated in Sections VI and VII .
V. THE RISE OF COMMODITY RISK MARKETS
As discussed earlier, markets for risk management instruments allow agents to
off-lay risks and are distinguished from market intervention schemes that seek to directly
alter the distribution of prices by changing the terms of trade or reducing price volatility.
The use of market-based hedging tools permits a Pareto efficient allocation of resources
and risks, but in reality, a full set of contingent markets does not exist -- especially for
time periods beyond several years. Further, market access can be of a problem for
producers who lack financial and technical wherewithal and an appropriate institutional
environment.
Ironically, policies designed to address perceived short-comings  of markets for
price risk or other development strategies often hampered the development of markets for
23 Claessens, Kreuser, Seigel and Wets (1997) have proposed specific tools to assist other countries in
developing similar management techniques.
24 There are more numerous examples of ad hoc linking debt to commodity price performance. For
example, the Confederate Staets of America issued bonds payable in bales of cotton in 1863 and the
former Soviet Union took on oil-indexed debt from private Japanese Banks in 1979 (O'Hara, 1984).
25 The US states of Alaska and Texas are exceptions.
26 See a discussion of STABEX in European Commission (1996.)
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price risk.  For example, buffer stock schemes designed  to provide multi-period price
27 smoothing sometimes lead to larger-than-expected  inventories  . And while ultimately
unsustainable, the schemes were in some cases successful in reducing volatility -- at least
temporarily. In addition, domestic stabilization  programs frequently decouple domestic
prices from international markets.  Futures and other risk management markets shrank or
sometimes disappeared as a result. In a similar way, brokerage houses and associated
regulatory laws and institutions were not needed in countries where marketing boards
mandated farmgate prices country-wide. Consequently,  the rise in global markets for risk
management instruments is due in part to a changing approach to commodity problems
by developed and developing countries.
Commodity markets and hedging.
Markets  for commodities  include spot, forward and futures.  In spot or cash
markets, prices set are for goods that will be delivered  promptly. Thus, while spot
markets provide price discovery,  this is only for today (contemporaneous)  prices. In
other word, spot markets do not provide price information for goods to be delivered in a
future date. This gap is addressed by forward and futures markets. Forward markets
involve the delivery of a good at a specific time in the future. Forward and futures
markets add the time dimension to spot markets. Thus, a seller or a buyer of goods can
set a price for the good that they will trade in a future day. Futures markets are similar to
forward markets but differ in four important areas. First, they are standardized in terms
of contract terms and thus they are fungible. Second, they involve margins (collateral) to
address the issue of counterparty  risk.  Third, they are traded in organized exchanges
under rules and regulations. Four, while forward contracts usually involve physical
delivery of goods at maturity, in futures markets users usually close their positions before
maturity. However, the important element in both forward and futures markets is that
users can hedge their price risk. They can lock-in today the price of the commodity they
wish to purchase or sell at a futures date. In forward market, the physical purchase and
hedging is in one transaction, while in futures market the physical purchase is often
separate from hedging.
Forward and futures markets for commodities are not recent phenomena. Futures
markets in commodities predate the now larger futures markets for other assets such as
currencies, bonds, and equities.  Agricultural  commodities (grains) futures started trading
at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT" in 1865. The London Metals Exchange (LME)
started trading base metals in 1878 and precious metals started trading at COMEX in
1933. Meat and livestock futures contracts were introduced at the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange in 1957. Some developing countries have also a long history in commodity
futures trading. During the late 1  800s the Buenos Aires Grain Exchange traded futures in
27 Examples  from the late 1980s  include  inventories  associated  with  the US CCC  program,  the EU
Common  Agricultural  Policy,  and  the ICCO's  buffer  stock.
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grains.  In India, futures trading was first introduced on the Bombay Cotton Exchange
and the Bombay Oilseeds & Oils Exchange as early as 1921 and 1926 respectively.
The great depression of the 1930s, the onset of W.W.II and a change in economic
thinking about economic development limited the use of commodity derivatives.  The
Prebish-Singer view of ever-diminishing commodity terms of trade, the idea of a
perfectly elastic supply of labor from the rural sector associated with Lewis'  (1954) dual
economy model, and Kuznets'(1955) theory that income inequality would diminish with
industrialization all contributed toward a policy bias against agriculture and commodity
sectors.  With increased government intervention and more interventionist policies in
commodity markets came a decline in the use of commodity risk management
instruments, especially in developing countries.  Trading ceased on the once thriving
grain exchange in Argentina, the cotton/oilseeds exchanges in India, and the cotton
exchange in Egypt. The disappearance of the Liverpool Cotton Exchange in the 1960s
can be attributed to the commitment of the OS government to purchase cotton at a fixed
price.  It was not until the 1980s when the failure of price stabilization schemes and the
adoption of policies market liberalization policies improved opportunities for the
development of markets for commodity risk management products.  Indeed, most of the
current futures exchanges in developing countries started after 1980. In addition, risk
management products, such as commodity derivatives, increased in popularity due to: (i)
trade and market liberalization that has resulted in increased linkages between world
prices and domestic prices; (ii) improvements in technology (communications,
software/hardware systems, etc.) and know-how; and (iii) a growth in the demand for
28 commodity instruments from institutional investors
As a result of the renewed interest in derivatives markets, trading volumes have
increased considerably during the 1990s at both exchanges and the OTC (over-the-
counter) market, providing more liquidity into derivatives markets and making them
more appealing to both hedgers and speculators (see box below).  For example, the
trading volume at the New York Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE) more than
doubled between the early 1980s and mid-1990s (see also Figure 1).  Similar growths
have been registered for NYMEX's energy and CBOT's grain contracts, while the
number of contracts traded at the Budapest Commodity Exchange increased more than
threefold during the 1990s. Maturities have also improved allowing even longer-term
hedges (more than 1-2 years) for certain commodities and for certain volume of
transactions, particularly in the OTC market.29 For example, a ten year hedge on oil price
exposure and a five year hedge on copper, aluminum or gold are feasible for certain
volumes.  However, for most of agricultural commodities maturities are still very
28 In  recent  years,  bond  portfolio  managers  have  increasingly  used  commodity  instruments  as a hedge
against  inflation.
29 The majority  of OTC  market  transactions  involve  metals  (precious  and base) and petroleumn  with only  a
very low  percentage  going  to agricultural  commodities.  Furthermore,  more  than 70%  of the OTC
transactions are within one year and only about 1% are for over five years.
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limited.  Most of the trading activity and open interest takes place in the first two to three
nearby contracts (months).  Somewhat higher maturities can be found in the OTC market
for agricultural commodities.
Description  of market  liquidty and mattirNesfor  arious  risk manageent  instruments.
Petroteum. Futures,  options.andOTC  markets-for  crude oil are very:liquid  and. iquidity  is adequate  even
.up  to seven  years  or more  (particularly  in the  OTC  market).  For  heating  oil.and  unleaded  gas,  there  is
exiough  liquidity  in futures, options  and  OTC  markets,'albeit  at som  ewhat shorter  maturities  -'ompared  to
crude oil.
Precious  Metals.  For gold and silver,  fitures, options  and OTC  markets  are quite  liquid. Liquidity  tends
to be adequate:  even for longer  maturities,  i.e.,  ten years in the OTC  market.
Base Metals.  Futures,  options  and OTC  markets  are quite  liquid  for copper  and alumiinum  with adequate
liquidity  to about three years. For other  base  metals,  such as lead,  tin, zinc and  nickel, derivatives  markets
are less liquid and maturities  tend  to be shorter.
Agricultural  Commodities.  There  is liquidity  for several  of major  agricultural  commodities  traded  at
exchanges  (coffee,  cocoa, corn, soybean  complex,  wheat,  cotton),  but liquidity  tends to concentrate  within
9 to 12 months. OTC  markets  are less  liquid,  but maturities  could be higher for certain  transactions.
Implications for developing countries.
Wider and deeper markets now provide better opportunities for commodity
producing developing countries to use risk management instruments.  Capital and
commodity market liberalization has also potentially improved access.  Some countries
already use these instruments.  For example, Chilean and Peruvian copper producing
companies have been using risk management instruments, as well as, several oil
companies in Latin America, Asia, the FSU, and to some extent in Africa.  In coffee and
cocoa various private exporters in Latin America, Asia, and starting now in Africa, are
users of futures and options contracts for hedging. According to some estimates, as much
as 50% of the growth in sugar business in the last four years at the London and New York
exchanges could be attributed to greater usage by producing countries.  Other
commodities for which there is an interest by developing countries include cotton, rubber,
palm oil, soybeans, frozen orange juice, maize and wheat.  However, with the possible
exception of sugar, only a very small share of the open interest and trading volumes at
agricultural commodity exchanges is attributed to developing countries. 30 In contrast,
developing countries are making a greater usage of risk management instruments for
metals and energy. Following the Gulf War, NYMEX reported a doubling of the open
interest in crude oil futures attributed to developing countries.  IPE's open interest
attributed to developing countries and economies in transition also more than doubled
30 According  to industry  estimates,  the share of developing  countries  of the open interest in futures  and
options for most commodities is under 2%.
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during the 1  990s.31  In terms of the geographic distribution, Latin American users appear
to have the largest share among developing countries and economies in transition.
Smaller shares are attributed to users from Asia, Middle East/North Africa, the
FSU/Eastern Europe, and lastly by users from Africa.
Why the significant interest from users in Latin America? First, Latin America
has large markets for several commodities such as coffee (Brazil, Colombia, and Central
America), grains (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico), oil--both exports (Colombia, Ecuador,
Mexico, Venezuela) and imports (Brazil, Chile)--, and metals (Chile, Peru).  Second,
market deregulation, privatization, trade reforms, and reforms in commodity markets
have been deeper and longer-lived resulting in reduced government intervention in
commodity markets and increased private sector participation. Commodity price risks
that were born by either the private or public sectors are now increasingly placed on
external markets.  Third, capital market reforms, the lifting of foreign exchange controls
and greater macroeconomic stability had spill over effects on commodity markets
contributing to the use of commodity risk management instruments.
For most part, the use of futures, options and OTC markets for commodities by
developing countries is confined to relatively large organizations, either state or private,
with very little participation on the part of producers or producer groups.  With respect to
exportable commodities such as coffee, cocoa, and sugar, foreign firms based in
developing countries actually perform price hedging at the point of export, but, such
hedging does not extend to local firms that sell the product to exporters or to farmers.
With respect to OTC instruments, their use is limited in developing countries with the
majority of the activity concentrated to petroleum and metals.  Users of OTC instruments
in developing countries are usually large entities, frequently government controlled, but
also more recently large private entities.
Generally, commodity risk management instruments in developing countries are
used to hedge price risks in specific transactions and thus covers relatively short horizons
-- usually between few months and a year.32 However, there are few examples of
companies that have employed longer-term strategic risk management strategies,
particularly linked to financing.  Examples include Mexicana de Cobre (a private
Mexican copper producing company), Sonatrach (Algeria's oil company), and, Ashanti
3  At both IPE and NYMEX  the open interest  for oil attributed  to developing  countries  and economies  in
transition is about 5-6% of the total.
32 Examples  of such  transactions  related  hedging  are: a coffee  exporter  buys coffee  upcountry  and does not
have a buyer. This  exporter  will sell futures  contracts  and  buy them back as soon  as he/she  finds a
buyer. This  way, the exporter  will protect  his/her  profit margins. In another  example,  an oil
company  sells crude  oil but price of crude  will be determined  at the time of shipment,  in a month or
so time. At the moment  of sale  the oil company  sells  futures  and buys them  back at the time of
shipment  to lock-in a price for the crude at the time of sale. However,  there are some  longer  term
hedging strategies  that link hedging  to investment  projects  (the repayment  of the loan  is linked  to
commodity  prices)
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Goldfields Corporation'(Ghana's  gold producing company).  Also, a few developing
country governments have used commodity derivatives to provide price protection to
farmers.  Examples include the provision of options to coffee farmers in Guatemala, and
cotton and maize farmers in Mexico.  Finally, some governments that have used
commodity derivative instruments strategically during extreme market situations.  For
example, during the Gulf War, the government of Mexico used commodity derivatives to
protect itself against price declines when budgeting its oil related revenues.  The
governments of Ecuador also pursued a similar strategy, while the governments of El
Salvador and Chile used options to hedge against increased import bills during the same
period.
In general, risk management instruments in developing countries are more readily
available for highly tradable commodities rather than commodities domestically produced
and consumed.  This is mainly because tradable commodities tend to have transparent
prices linked to international markets prices (as a result of market liberalization and
globalization) often determined at commodity exchanges (coffee, copper, cotton, cocoa,
petroleum, and metals, in Now York and London; grains in Chicago).  On the other hand,
commodities that are mainly domestically produced and consumed have a higher
incidence of government intervention and domestic prices often are weakly linked to
international prices.  This tends to be the case for grains in a number of countries, where
governments adopt pricing and trade policies to ensure self-sufficiency.  There are also
certain commodities for which markets tend to have a geographic segmentation mainly
related to the feasibility and cost of transport.  For example, livestock, and natural gas
markets tend to be local markets.  Even so, regional markets for risk management
instruments often evolve.  For example, metals and agricultural futures markets have
evolved in China -- despite trade restrictions, and livestock derivatives have been
developed in Argentina and Hungary. 33
VI. PUBLIC APPROACHES  TO EMERGING  RISK
MARKETS
Much of the literature on commodity risk management centers on the sources and
consequences of risk on farmers, traders, processors and governments.  Also much
discussed are the failures of policies designed to limit the perceived harm wrought by
volatile commodity prices.  Less discussed are the numerous efforts by governments and
the development community to provide support for the development of private risk
management markets and developments in the markets themselves.  This section provides
a very cursory review of such programs with the hope of encouraging other researchers to
better document and analyze such efforts.  Table 6 summarizes the main barriers to
accessing risk management instruments in developing countries classified by commodity
groups and puts into a perspective the areas where support and solutions are focusing.
For a full discussion  see Larson  and Varangis  (1996).
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Programs to develop know-how
Technical skills associated with risk management is often lacking -- especially in
newly liberalized markets. Of course, as with markets in physical commodities, markets
for risk management instruments involve a number of actors with varying needs and
levels of understanding. Several international  organization offer programs designed to
provide technical assistance to both policy makers and market participants. For example,
UNCTAD, the International Trade Center, the Common Fund for Commodities, and the
World Bank all offer broad-based technical assistance 34. In addition, there are several
groups that offer quite specialized information. For example, The International
Organization of Securities Commissions publishes a comparative review of international
regulatory systems 35 and the IRIS Center at the University of Maryland offers a survey of
collateral law. 36
At the other end of the spectrum, producers, traders and processors are most
interested in the specifics of their commodity markets and the relevant international
markets.  Several in-country commodity associations have been especially effective in
offering information and guidance to their membership. Examples include ASKINDO,
the Indonesian Cocoa Association and ANACAFE in Guatemala. The private sector and
government often work  jointly on establishing local exchanges and technical information
comes from private and public sources. For example, the Chicago Board of Trade, in
exchange for equity, is currently working with local investors and the Government of
Poland to establish a local futures exchange and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange is
working with the public and private sector in Indonesia.
Addressing problems related to credit, collateral and counter-party risk
From interviews with providers of risk management instruments, the greater
challenge for producers, traders and processors in many developing countries lies in
overcoming their low credit rating and a lack of adequate collateral for hedging
transactions.  Providers of risk management instruments increasingly offer instruments to
middle income countries in Latin America, Asia, Middle East and Eastern Europe.
However, risk management services are more rarely offered in poorer countries, and
where markets are newly emerging.
For example, the ITC offers a useful set of commodity-specific  handbooks that includes information on
physical markets as well as markets for risk instruments (ITC, 1990). UNCTAD has been especially
active in recent years on risk management research and has organized regional conferences on risk
management experiences (for example, UNCTAD, 1997). Among other things, the World Bank has
offered assistance to govemment treasuries on managing debt composition and to traders in emerging
markets.
This document is available for downloading at:
http://www.iosco.org/regulation_of_derivative_markets.html
36 Visit http://www.inform.umd.edu/lRIS/survey.htmI.
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Larger-scale and more sophisticated  market participants can and do use off-shore
accounts to meet margin requirements,  or to directly purchase options, thereby avoiding
local market constraints. Moreover, importers can frequently take advantage of guarantee
programs when purchases exports from developed countries. Exporters in developing
countries however, must rely on indirect risk management techniques. Where financial
institutions are weak, exporters often enter into pre-financing arrangements  with
importers to limit exchange-rate risks. (See Varangis and Larson, 1996.) However, pre-
financing credit and risk-management arrangements  tend to be very short-term and
restrict marketing options as well.
Another approach is to use inventories to finance trade and sometimes bundle risk
management services. Silos and warehouse operators function as intermediaries.
Sometimes banks will enter into arrangements with traders or processors to provide a line
of credit based on inventory levels. The value of the inventories is then hedged either
directly, or by lending against only a portion of the inventory value. Unlike other
collateral, the value of inventories match market price changes and capital needs. In
Venezuela, for example, several coffee exporters have private arrangements with local
banks.  In other countries, for example Uganda, a private inventory management
company such as ACE or SGS will monitor inventories on behalf of the lender. At a
more sophisticated level, a standardized  warehouse receipt is granted a special legal status
and serves as a transferable instrument. In such cases, the role of the government is to
provide the legal infrastructure for receipt-based  trade, regulate and monitor warehouse
operators and help with the establishment of standards. In some cases, for example
several US states, a government agency manages an indemnity fund to insure receipt
holders. Receipts are also used in spot and futures markets -- for example, the
agricultural exchange in Zimbabwe  . See also Glaessner, Reid and Todd (1992),
Varangis and Larson (1996b), and Coulter and Shepherd (1995) for more on warehouse
receipts.
Solutions for problems of scale and aggregation
Developing country producers of metals and energy face fewer hurdles in
accessing risk markets because of the scale of the firms.  In addition, multinational firms
frequently have equity stakes and bring in-house risk management expertise. For
agricultural commodities in developing countries, production and trade is usually
fragmented and diffused. Providers of risk management instruments have to deal with
smaller companies, often with short history in the business -- especially in emerging
markets. Local banks, silos and warehouse companies can provide a distribution
network, but often supporting financial sectors are weak. Consequently, a key issue in
making available these instruments to small producers is building the necessary
institutions that would allow the retailing of risk management instruments to small
37 Trade in warehouse receipts predates trading in futures contracts in Chicago. (Williams, 1986.)
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producers. In other words, the challenge is to build a system that would allow the
aggregation of price risks from many small producers by a larger entity and this entity
should hedge its assumed price exposure in international  or local markets.
In some cases, the government or association puts in place directly an aggregating
institution. Examples include the government agency ASERCA in Mexico which hedges
cotton prices on behalf of producers (see section VII. below) and the National Coffee
Association of Guatemala, ANACAFE, which provides similar services for smallholder
coffee producers. More specifically, ANACAFE has trained local banks and many local
exporters about hedging strategies and price risk management with the objective to
guarantee loan repayment. ANACAFE facilitates the provision of credit lines to
producers requiring that coffee is hedged to guarantee repayment of principal and interest
of the loan. 38
Issues of basis risk and local markets
Basis risk arises because the design of futures contracts traded in developed
countries reflects mostly local needs which may be quite different from needs in
developing countries.  High basis risk can result from a variety of factors such as the
characteristics of the futures/options contract, local policies, grade or quality differences,
transportation and local supply-demand  characteristics. A high basis risk can make it
impractical to utilize a particular futures/options contract for hedging purposes. Basis
risk is more of an issue for agricultural commodities and much less so for metals and
energy. Agricultural markets tend to be more localized, while energy and metals markets
tend to be more global. Among agricultural markets, markets for exportable tropical
commodities such as coffee and cocoa are considered global and basis risk tends to be
relatively small.  OTC markets could overcome some of the problems related to basis
risk.  However, OTC products, if at all available, in markets characterized  with high basis
risk would tend to be expensive, thus increasing the cost of hedging. In dealing with
basis risk, some developing countries have established, and others are planning to
establish, commodity futures/options  markets. Argentina, Brazil, China, Hungary, India,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe have functioning
commodity derivatives exchanges, while Bulgaria, Indonesia, Poland, Romania,
Thailand, and Turkey are in the process of establishing commodity derivatives
exchanges.
In several instances, a source of basis risk is government policies. Countries that
have reduced government intervention have established a greater linkage between
38 A structure  developed  involved  the provision  of a two-year  loan  to coffee  producers  structured  as
prepayment financing through Cargill. Included in the loan was a coffee price risk management
scheme in the form of a zero-cost collar (where producers are guaranteed a minimum price and paid
for this price insurance by agreeing to a maximum sale price for their coffee). Principal and interest
of the loan were paid through physical delivery of coffee to Cargill Guatemala.
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domestic prices and international prices allowing the use of commodity derivatives
instruments in existing international derivatives markets. Finally, on the policy front,
many developing countries have been pursuing commodity market liberalization which
has resulted in creating greater opportunities for using risk management instruments by
providing for improved local price discovery and closer linkages of domestic prices to
international  prices. Examples of donor supported efforts to improve price discovery and
information delivery systems in developing countries include an on-going World Bank
project in Mexico and a USAID projects in Venezuela and Poland. In addition,
improvements  in communications and the development of the Internet has allowed
increasing opportunities for computer-based  trading and price discovery. For example,
visit the Caribbean Commodity Exchange or the Continental Commodity Exchange.
Related to the issue of the basis risk is the fact that in several developing countries
there are no reliable and consistent local prices that can be used as a benchmark in
commodity risk management transactions. As commodity markets in many developing
countries have recently undergone changes from a fixed pricing system to a market-based
pricing system, there is little experience with respect to establishing a transparent, liquid,
and reliable price reporting system. For agricultural commodities, grade and quality
differentiation is important. Developing countries should put special emphasis to
establish reliable, transparent and usable commodity  price series and devise systems that
would improve the dissemination  of price information.
VII. EXAMPLES OF MARKET BASED ALTERNATIVES
Issues of intermediation: the case of agricultural smallholders
It is well established that most agricultural producers do not access commodity
derivatives markets directly. This is mainly because of lack of know how, lack of
collateral for margins, small scale of operations, and too cumbersome to execute, monitor
and administer hedging transactions by small producers. Even at developed countries for
larger farm units, producers make relatively little direct use of commodity derivatives
markets. More so in developing countries where smallholders even less in the position to
access commodity derivatives whether they are traded at their own country or somewhere
else.
The key issue for producers in developing countries to access commodity
derivatives to hedge their price risks is to set up a system to intermediate risk
management instruments to farmers. In other words, there needs to be institutional
arrangements so a large domestic entity can pool price risks from many small farmers and
hedge them in the international  market. The organization that can do that could be
private or public entity. Below we present the case of ASERCA in Mexico as an
intermediary to hedge price risks for cotton farmers.
22Commodity risk management and development  Larson, Varangis and Yabuki
Mexico's Cotton Price Support Scheme. Because of the recent liberalization of
agricultural trade and internal marketing systems in Mexico, farm-level prices of several
agricultural products are now determined mainly by international  markets, and farmers
have had to cope with price uncertainty between planting and harvest times to a degree
unknown before. During 1993, for example, the international price of cotton fluctuated
between 52 and 60 cents a pound.
The government has responded with a program designed to guarantee a minimum
price to cotton growers. Through ASERCA, a government organization providing
support services for agricultural commercialization, Mexican cotton producers are able to
manage their price risks during the harvest period and are guaranteed a minimum price
during the planting season. Although programs guaranteeing minimum prices are
common, most programs simply transfer price risks from producers to the government
budget through the floor price mechanism, and most programs fail-sometimes
spectacularly-when  sudden price changes overstrain the government budget. Necessity
is the mother of invention, and ASERCA, lacking the budget to assume the price risk
directly, designed a sustainable program to transfer the risks from growers to
international markets.
During the planting season, ASERCA offers farmers  the chance to participate in a
program guaranteeing a minimum cotton price for a fixed fee. The minimum price is
fixed using the New York cotton futures exchange. For a fee, ASERCA offers a
guaranteed price (in US dollars) and hedges its own risk by using the fee to purchase a
put option on the exchange for future delivery at harvest time.  (The put option gives
ASERCA the right to sell cotton on a specific future date at a prespecified price, known
as the strike price.)  Should prices subsequently  fall, ASERCA pays farmers the
difference between the New York price at harvest and the minimum price. This
difference is exactly equal to the payoff value of the put option. If prices rise instead,
ASERCA makes no payment to farmers. By paying a fee and participating in the
program, a farmer in effect purchases insurance against a drop in prices below a certain
level-in fact, the program refers to the fee as a "premium." As with insurance, payouts do
not always occur, so the program is not without costs. Private brokers could offer similar
programs, although the private sector has had little experience in providing such services
directly to growers. Since ASERCA's program is inexpensive to administer and demand
driven, however, ASERCA can readily reduce its presence should a market for private
brokers develop.
Hedging government revenues related to commodity prices: the case of oil
In several developing countries government revenues depend on commodity
prices. The largest exposure that governments in developing countries have is mainly
from oil related revenues and to a lesser extent from metal or agricultural exports related
revenues. These revenues accrue as a result of ownership of the natural resource (mainly
in the case of oil for most developing countries) or royalties and taxes from metal
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producing companies (most of them privatized by now in most developing countries).
Volatility in government revenues can be detrimental from a budgetary point of view.  If
revenues unexpectedly decline due to a fall in commodity  prices the government needs to
either cut expenditures or run a deficit and borrow in the international markets.
Borrowing in this case could be difficult as financial markets may not be willing to lend
or the cost of lending maybe high if commodity prices stay low.
Why hedge revenue volatility? The simplest reason is so that government
revenues are not a function of commodity prices. Governments  can increase the
probability that the expected revenues will actually be materialized. If government
borrow, lenders will see a less volatile source of revenue and they will lend at more
attractive rates. Another reason for hedging is that the effect of an extreme move in
commodity prices can be such as to create significant  financial and budgetary problems
for the government. There are many examples of governments  not putting some kind of
limit on their commodity exposure and as a result running into problems.
One might consider the case of Mexico during 1998.39 While oil accounts for
about 10% of Mexico's exports, it accounts for about 40% of government revenues.
Furthermore, it was calculated that a $1 per bbl drop in the price of oil corresponds to
$800 million drop in government revenues. During the early 1997, crude oil was trading
at about $21 per bbl.  The Government  made a revenue plan based on the assumption that
this would continue. This was not unrealistic since in early 1997 the market was
forecasting a 2.7% probability that the price of crude oil a year later (in early 1998) would
be under $14 per bbl. 40 And for most of 1997 oil prices were around $19-$20 per bbl.
But in fact, crude oil prices fell during the first quarter of 1998 by nearly one-third, or
about $4.4 per barrel, since December 1997. In addition, investor's were put-off by the
low oil prices questioning the robustness of the economy. In this country's case, if the
price in early 1998 had been close to the forward  price one year ago, the government
budget would have been safe. However, the price of crude oil moved to the low end of
the expected range a year ago. In this case, the result is serious problems for the
government budget. The Government could have easily averted this by buying an
insurance against a catastrophic dip in crude oil prices. This insurance (effectively a put
option) would have been inexpensive a year ago since the probability for a price decline
below $14 per bbl was only 2.7%.
In contrast, in 1991, petroleum prices fell with the end of Gulf War, but the
Mexican government enjoyed the benefits of an oil-price insurance policy it obtained in
the oil derivatives market. The Mexican govermment's  overall strategy was to ensure at
39 On March 30, 1998 Business Week run an article entitled "Mexico Slips in an Oil Puddle: As crude
prices plunge, investors worry about the economy"
40 Probabilities were detennined by analyzing option prices at that time (early 1997).
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least a $17 per barrel price for oil, the price used as the basis for its 1991 budget. 4'
Following the end of the Gulf War, crude oil prices dropped to the low teens compared to
around $25 during the crisis.
It is easy to come up with examples of hedges that would have been profitable. In
this example, the hedge happens to be profitable. It would have been  just as easy to find
an example of an unprofitable hedge. The point of this example is to show that managing
commodity price risks can decrease the chance of damaging financial situations like
many oil exporting countries faced in early 1998.
The high dependency of government revenues on commodity prices applies to
several developing countries. This tends to be the case for many oil exporting countries
such as for example Congo, Gabon, Algeria, Venezuela, Malaysia, Cameroon, Mexico
and Indonesia. Even in diversified economies such as Malaysia, Mexico and Indonesia a
10% change in oil prices would correspond to 5.3%, 3.5% and 2% change in government
revenues respectively. Also, the revenues of several governments of agricultural
exporting countries show high exposure to commodity prices. Examples are:
Madagascar, Ethiopia and Uganda (coffee), Burkina Faso, Mali and Sudan (cotton), Cote
d'Ivoire and Ghana (cocoa), and Guyana (sugar).
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Commodity dependent developing countries are negatively affected by
commodity price instability and previous efforts to deal with price volatility have not
been satisfactory. Intervention in commodity markets with the objective to stabilize
prices has been costly and overall ineffective, with large negative effects when the
various price stabilization schemes collapse. Many governments and institutions are
considering new approaches. The academic literature has shown benefits in using
market-based risk management instruments to reduce commodity  price uncertainty as
opposed to stabilizing prices. While there has been a large proliferation in the use of
these instruments the last ten years, developing countries face certain problems in
accessing market-based risk management instruments.
Volatile commodity prices effect exchange rates, the cost of debt, government
revenue, and private producers, processors,  traders and consumers. These problems and
their solutions differ. Very broadly, the problems associated with government entities
center on the capacity and incentives to develop and execute risk management strategies.
Further, markets for longer-term instruments are thin or missing. For private entities,
41 On March 11, 1991 the Wall Street Journal run an article entitled "Mexico's Moves to Lock In Oil Prices in Gulf
Crisis Mean It Can Stay Calm Now as the Market Softens". According to the WSJ article a Finance Ministry official
explained the reasoning behind the hedging strategy by saying: "It is extremely important  for us that investors know
that, no matter happens to the price of oil, the economic program is on for 1991. Regardless of what happens, we've
got $17 a barrel...and there's enough in the kitty."
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there are a number of barriers that limit access to current markets. Chief among these are:
a lack of knowledge and understanding, counterparty  risk, and inadequate legal,
regulatory and institutional environments. In addition, markets for some commodities
and for weather-based instruments are missing or newly evolving.
Developing countries can take some actions that would improve their access to
risk management instruments. These could include:
*  Institution building in terms of intermediaries  that would access smallholders
and small to medium size domestic companies that lack the size and
technology to access risk management markets directly. Institution building
should involve the development of appropriate legal and regulatory
infrastructures to address such issues as contract enforcement, for example.
*  Technical assistance could focus in the design of innovative products that
would be more acceptable  in these countries and would cater to local
conditions. These products need to address issues related to cost and counter-
party risk exposure. There is also a need to design better ways to provide
collateral that deals with the counter-party  risk in hedging transactions.
*  More analysis should be done on how to implement and regulate risk
management programs and markets. These programs should be country and
possibly commodity specific and involve several disciplines within the
country (e.g., banks, insurance companies, legal departments, etc.).
*  The development of information systems and dissemination of information is
crucial. Furthermore, there is scope for increasing awareness in using existing
information systems.
*  Developing appropriate price indices that serve as reference for hedging
instruments. Greater price transparency and dissemination  of price signals
plays an important role.
The international community can also play a role in assisting developing countries
to access risk management instruments.
*  Research should be funded on programs and policies that complement small-
holder efforts to self-insure. Current research suggests that policies and
programs  that promote  markets  -- including financial  markets  -- promote  self-
insurance. Research into the limits of self-insurance is needed as well.
*  The international community can also be more active in providing technical
assistance and strategy advice regarding the broad design and implementation
of risk management instruments. Advice on legal, regulatory, institutional and
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policy reforms that would facilitate the use of risk management instruments is
also important.
*  Finally, international financing institutions should consider ways to extend
limited markets. Such efforts might include combining risk management
instruments with their lending products
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Figure  1: Selected commodity price indices.
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Figure 2: Barter  terms of trade indices.
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Figure 3: Instability  measure  for selected commodities.
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Table 1: Chicago Board of Trade Daily Volatility Report for June 11, 1998
Commodity  Contract  Volatility
1000 Ounce Silver  98Dec  31.26
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Table 2: Decomposition of the variance of export revenue
Revenue  Q  P  2Cov(P,Q)
Cocoa  0.204  0.056  0.219  -0.071
Coffee  0.236  0.019  0.221  -0.004
Cotton  0.114  0.014  0.079  0.021
Maize  0.270  0.073  0.069  0.129
Rice  0.241  0.072  0.099  0.070
Sugar  0.217  0.019  0.149  0.049
Wheat  0.239  0.061  0.090  0.088
Table 3: Correlation  between commodity index pairs
Beverages  ats & Oils  Fertilizers  Grain  Metals&  Non-energy  Petroleum  Timber
Beverages  1.0*
Fats and Oils  0.78*  .0*
Fertilizers  0.52*  .80*  1.0*
Grain  0.61*  .92*  0.92*  1.0*
Metals&Minerals  0.65*  .80*  0.72*  0.79*  1.0*
Non-energy Com.  0.83*  .93*  0.79*  0.88* 0.93*  1.0*
Petroleum  0.71*  .77*  0.70*  0.77*  0.79*  0.85*  1.0*
Timber  0.41  .61*  0.54*  0.61* 0.79*  0.76*  0.57*  1.0*
Note: Pearson Correlation Coefficients / Prob > V2RI/2  under Ho:  Rho + 0 / N = 38
* significant at the 95% level
Source: Author's calculations based on the data from World Bank
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Table 4:  List of Countries with Export Dependenceon Three  Leading Commodities Greater  than 50%
Export dependence  Leadinu  Commodities  (GDP  per  Capita  Poverty  External  Deblt  as  Debt  Service  as % of
on 3 lending  % of GNr)  exports  of goods  and
commodities  services
LUSS  A-  annuvtal  %o  of people  living on
Growth  l  (ss  than  St  a)da
1'90-92  in I  995  I90i5.95  I9-  -1)  1995  199S
Africa  (34)
Congo  90.0  luels,  wood,  s:gar  6XI)  (31  2);iS  14  4
Gabon  99.0  fuels, manganese  ore. wood  3.490  (1 2)  121 6  15 8
Nigeria  99.0  fuels  2((0  2  2S ).  14(t  i  123
Burkina Faso  99.0  cotton  23;(  ((1  2)  ii5  I  I
Zambia  99 0  colpper  400(  (II S)  84  6  1913  174 4
Niger  95.7  u,ranilultt  220  6I  5  9 I2  19  t
Angola  94.5  ruels  4101  (6 1  )74  1)  12  5
Benin  93  8  cottonn,  tels  170  1° 3)  l S  0 4
Guinea-Bissau  92.0  ntits.  fishelr  2v1  2  87 (  353 7  66.9
Guinea  91  3  bauxite.  aluminum  51  4  26 3  9) 2  25.3
Malawi  80.0  tobacco.  tea,  sugar  17(0  l1)  7)  I16S  25.9
Algeria  000  fulels  1.6(,))  (24)  I .6  s;1I  3S 7
Burundi  87.9  coffee,  tea  I(SO  I  1I(11  27 7
Mauritania  87  8  iron ore.  fisltery  4111  i  15  31 4  243;3  21.5
Uganda  81.5  coffee,  cotton  240  27  5111  63 7  21.3I
Zaire  (Congo)  81.5  copper,  fuels,  coffee  12(0
Equatorial  Guinea  81.4  swood,  cocoa,  banana  30
Cameroon  81.0  tuels.  wood,  coffee  (,5(1  (1, 0)  124  4  20.1
Ethiopia  790  cxllee  10  ((o31  33 R  9'113.6
Cape  Verde  78  9  fishery.  banana  9611
Rwanda  78  0  coffee,  tea.  tin ore  I  Il  (5 4)  45 7  09 I
Mali  7;.  otton  2501  t0  S  13  M  12.6
Comoros  70.5  vanilla  470  (I  4)
Ghana  67 4  cocoa.  aluminum.  wood  390  1.4  I1  23 1
Togo  63  7  phosphate  rock,  cotton.  coffee  3111  (2 7)  121  2  5 7
Chad  69.9  cotton  Il  X0  14  S 9
Mozalmtbique  5S I  l,erv, 011s.  sotlolt  S0  316  443 (I  35 3
Somalia  57.8  lise animals.  fishery. banana
Egypt  i9.7  fuels,  cottoil.  alumantim  790  I  7  6  7  33  14,6
Kenya  i(a  0  tea.  cot'ee. tiels  21(1  I  i51  2  177  2s 7
Central  African  Republic  55.7  .srsl..  live  animtals.  co,tton  ;41  (2 4)  6  .
Sudan  55  7  ci mson.  live a  -i-nalx.  soxanIle  seeds
Cote  d'oire  55  0  c,coa,  toels.  wocod  66.11  17  7  2;1 7  23 1
Zimbab-e  531  1  obacc-o.  nickel.  cotton  541)  (11  1.J  41  II  78  v)  25  6
Asia  (9)
Yemen  '1  02  toels  21(,1  11S2  32
Syrian  1  ,14  |Rel,  1.121  _  1  i4x  46
C,anbodia  '19  0  s-x,d. mbber.  soybeans  270  ,  73  01  6
Myanmar  99.0  o  sod,  pulses.  rice
Afghanistan  78.5  luels.  grapes  & raisins
Maldives  73 5  fisherv.  olives  '.X)11
Meonghlia  68.4  copper  ore,  live  otimals.  n  ool  3110  (3  01  (,1  I'  I
Lao PDR  651  (  s o-*d,  Ive aoi,mals,  cos'tfe  3  i)  27  124'1  5 8
Indonesia  53  1  fuelx, weed,  tisherv  '1611  1,11  14;  -1  l1
Latiin  America  (14)
Venezuela  08 I  (uel, alsirin-m.  iron s,re  1211I
Ecuador  816  3  tueB, banana.  fisher,v  1  .111  1) 0  III  4  X4  1  26 7
St Vinecnt  &  Grenadines  7') 5  hano,,a.  ti,her,  2,20(1  3 s
Guvyma  77 5  sugar.  Iauxite  5511)  I
Paraguay  1,9  0  cottn.  soybeans  I.('I  I2  2I 4
Trinidad  and  Tobago  1. 4  flols.  spgar  3 7I  II  7)  ;;,  14  8
Jamaica  17  3  aliiiaiti,tt,tt  hauxste.  smacr  I  5111  11,  4 7  1 4)  17  ')
Dominican  Republic  66.3  nickel,  sopAr.  coence  1.41,1  2 I  II)')  31,5  7 8
Honduras  6;  h11  banana.  coffee, fisherv  (.  o0  4o,  s  124  I,  31  I
D),ninica  58  0  banana  2.4  I
Colombia  556  fuels.  co,ffee,  banana  1.9111  21'  '4  2s2  2s2
Belize  53  8  ssmgar.  jlices, banana  2.1,3: 
Chile  525  colpper.  fishery  4.1(.1  1  5  I  25  7
Grennda  5119  spices,  banana,  cocoa  2.11(1
Sources:  UNCTAD 1  995 Commodity Yearbook, World  Bank, 1  997,  World Development Report.Table 5: Categories of commodity-risk management  problems.
Economy-wide risk management problems
1. Macroeconomic mismanagment
2. Counter-party and sovereign risk
3. Severe litmits on brokerage and supporting banking services
4. Lack of legal and regulatory infrastructure
5. Limited or non-existent markets for some types of financial instruments
Policy instruments
1. Policy advice and adjustment lending
2. Sovereign risk guarantees and improved contractual laws and enforecemnt
3. Technical assistance
4. Potential multi-lateral role in facilitating global markets for some instruments.
Public and private sector problems related to commodity risk managemnt
Private Sector  Public Sector  Quasi-public Parastatals
1. Inefficient local commodity  1. Fluctuating Central Bank reserves  1. Oversight and reporting of risk
markets  management activities.
2. Counter party risk  2. Fluctuating government budget  2. Perverse incentives may preclude
revenues and expenses  appropriate risk management.
3. Small-scale activity  3. Reated short-term and long-term
debt managment  problems
4. Basis risk  4. "Agent" problems related to
objectives, management, reporting
and corruption
5. poor credit markets
Long-term  policy instruments  and policy objectives
I. Improve market access and market  I. Improved regulatory, oversight,  1. Improved regulatory, oversight,
information for local commodity  and enforecment capacity  and enforecment capacity
markets;
2. Improved financial and other  2. Diversification  through growth  2. Privatization.
supporting services
3. Delivery of risk management  3. Improve asset management
instruments through private  capacity in Treasury and Central
intermediaries: brokers, warehouses,  Bank.
etc.
Short-term policy instruments and objectives
1. Remove policy-based impediments  1. Include commodity-based  1. Out-source risk management
to underlying physical markets.  instruments in debt portfolio.  functions
2. Technical assistance  2. Hedge govemment budget against  2. Develop administrative capacity
commodity price declines  and technical know-how to handle
hedging
3. Government or association-based  3. Include commodity-based  3. Put in place independent and
transitional intermediary agency ( for  instruments in Central Bank  reporting, auditing and trading
example, ASERCA in Mexico).  operations.  groups.
4. Government sponsored  4. Put in place independent and
instruments (especially weather-  reporting, auditing and trading
related) and safety nets  groups.
5. Access risk management services
through intermediaries.Table 6: Barriers  to commodity price risk management  in developing countries by commodity group
Lack of  Counter  Intermed  Basis Risk  Lack of  Low
Know how  Party Risk  iation  Local Price  Liquidity
issues  Discovery
Petroleum  Some cases  Maybe for  No  No  No  No
some
countries
Precious  Some cases  Maybe for  No  No  No  No
Metals  some
countries
Base Metals  Some cases  Maybe for  No  No (copper,  No  No (copper,
some  alum.),  alum.).
countries  possibly some  Could be an
basis risk  issue for
with others  others
Agriculture:  Moderate  Yes  Yes  For some  Moderate  moderate
Mlainly  (e.g. cotton)  (less of an
Exports  less for others  issue for
(e.g. coffee,  coffee, cocoa,
cocoa, sugar)  sugar)
Agriculture:  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  moderate (but
for Local  not for grains
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